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UK Welfare Reform 1996 to 2007 and beyond: 
 





The UK welfare system has undergone three very profound periods of reform of the 
post-war model laid down by Beveridge. The first was a move in the direction of the 
Bismarkian model of a contributory social insurance model with time-limited 
earnings-related benefits with a low value means tested social assistance safety net. 
This occurred slowly through the 1960s and up to the mid-1970s. The second phase 
started in 1979 and involved a dramatic move to curtail the social insurance 
entitlements and end all earnings-related benefits. The result was a residualist low 
value means tested social assistance model, which ended both the Beveridge model 
and completely reversed the drift toward  Europe’s Bismarkian approach. Finally, 
from 1996 a new model has emerged based on an activational welfare model with 
greater emphasis on incentives, support services and conditionality. As a direction of 
travel from the previous regime(s) this represents an increase in the engagement 
and support functions, increases in the (disciplinary) required activity functions 
combined with increased financial support for children and pensioners and 
personalised support services. The emerging model is far from completion and the 
final make up of the system remains uncertain. However, it bears strong similarities 
with developments in New Zealand and to a degree Australia and Canada. Within 
Europe the model most closely resembles a less generous version of the welfare 
systems in Denmark or Holland, which are sometimes referred to as embodying 
Flex-security. This evolutionary process of reform had some antecedents prior to 
1996, but has really come to the fore since that date. As a result, this paper 
discusses reform in depth from 1996 and looks at its current direction of change with 




1. The Post-war UK Welfare System  
  
1.1 The Beveridge Plan 1942 
Although the origins of the British welfare started prior to the Second World War, it 
was with the Beveridge plan of 1942 that the modern welfare state came into being. 
Already a century ago all political parties agreed that the state would have to play a 
bigger role in providing pensions and welfare for the poor. Among the key measures 
introduced were old age pensions, a system of health insurance, and labour 
exchanges to help tackle unemployment. However, the Edwardian welfare state was 
incomplete. It was limited to the working class, its funding basis was insecure, and 
little progress was made in tackling poverty among people of working age. The end 
of the WWI also brought a slump, particularly in northern industrial towns, that 
deepened into the Great Depression by the l930s.  
By the time Britain entered the Second World War, the pressures for social reform 
were mounting. In 1942 the Beveridge Report laid out a comprehensive programme 
of social reform "from the cradle to the grave". His report called for a universal flat- 
rate low value benefit payable to all, on the basis of fixed national insurance 
contributions. Beveridge wanted to tackle what he called the "five giants" - want, 
disease, squalor, ignorance, and idleness - through a universal welfare state which 
would also provide a comprehensive health service, vastly expanded public housing, 
and free and universal secondary education. Welfare benefits were to cover old age, 
unemployment, and sickness, as well as benefits for the poor and family allowances. 
The new Labour government, which took power in 1945, was keen to implement the 
Beveridge report in full as soon as possible. But, in the severe conditions of post-war 
Britain, it did not have the money to pay an adequate level of flat-rate benefits that 
would keep people out of poverty. So from early on, the residual National Assistance 
(later Supplementary Benefit and now Income Support) played a bigger role in 
alleviating poverty than Beveridge had planned. Family allowances were also never 
implemented in the generous way Beveridge had proposed, but they did become 
more generous in the 1970s as Child Benefit. The idea of basing entitlement on 
contributions meant that many people, especially women, were excluded from the 
system. The male bread-winner nuclear family and full employment - and the relative 
prosperity that went with it - were key to Beveridge's plan.  
By the mid-1970s the post-war model had evolved from the Beveridge plan into a 
system closer to a Bismarkian European model with earnings-related payments for 
unemployment, sickness and pensions, but with time limits on payments for 
unemployment. However, the gender bias in support through contributions which 
excluded part-time jobs with shorter hours, as well as those looking after the family, 
lead to the pressures to widen the net to marginal groups, thus weakening the 
insurance principle. 
 
The long period of Conservative government (1979-1997) saw a steady erosion of 
the Social Insurance model, with all earnings-related links removed, except for 
second stage pensions. Yet even here people were given incentive to opt out of the 
state second stage pension into private pension saving instead. The exemption from 
means testing for unemployment benefits was also reduced to 6 months. The benefit 
system thus became a residualised flat-rate system with large reliance on means-
tested social assurance benefits (Income Support). The levels of these benefits were 
fixed in real terms so that their value relative to earnings progressively fell and Child 
Benefits were often not even uprated with prices. 
 
1.2 The Role of Government, Business and Trade Unions 
The Beveridge Report, after some resistance from the Conservative party, was 
implemented by the incoming 1945 Labour government and formed a broad political 
consensus. The National Insurance system was operated fully by the government as 
another form of revenue raising and expenditure counterpart. It was never created as 
a fund separated from government revenues and hence had no overseeing body 
representing the social partners. In addition to no direct role for employers and 
trades unions, the system was operated entirely by central government with no role 
for local or regional government. However, there were tripartite bodies setting 
minimum wages at the industry level (Wages Councils, see Dickens et al. 1993) and 
through the 1960s and 70s a number of tripartite bodies grew up discussing 
economic performance, wage setting, etc. This era was characterised as that of 
“beer and sandwiches”, as union leaders were regularly meeting government 
ministers over threatened strikes and many other issues. Trades unions often 
campaigned successfully for a number of extensions to working rights, including 
reductions in working hours, redundancy payments and even limited worker  
representation. However, in the Conservative era all tripartite bodies were abolished, 
including the setting of minimum pay levels (in 1993) and restrictions placed on the 
ability of trade unions to hold strike action and support other workers involved in 
disputes. Trade union membership and influenced plummeted after 1979.  
 
1.3 Welfare Dependency and Social Expenditure 
In 1979 around 2 million working age adults were claiming major welfare benefits 
(unemployment, long-term sickness/disability and lone parenthood). Social 
expenditures covering these benefits, universal child assistance (Child Benefit) and 
pensions ran to around 7% of GDP. However, from 1979 the value of the benefits 
received remained broadly frozen in real terms, and so relative poverty rose steadily 
among those without work. Yet total expenditures rose as a proportion of GDP to 
around 13.5% in 1994 (see Figure 1 for breakdown of expenditures). This mainly 
occurred because of the dramatic rise in welfare dependency associated with the 
growing number of jobless households (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1999). This rose so 
dramatically that by 1994 the numbers of working age welfare claimants had reached 
6 million, before falling back to 5.5 million by 1997 (see Figure 2).  The largest 
increase was for claims of sickness and disability benefits, with a rise of nearly 2 
million. Not only had dependency risen dramatically, but the poverty gap among 
those on welfare (and in work) had risen dramatically. The proportions of working 
age adults and children living on incomes below 60% of the median (BHC) more 
than doubled between 1979 and 1996. But rises in the proportion below 50%, 40% 
and even 30% grew even faster. People were falling much deeper into poverty 
before the safety net held them.   
Figure 1 Share of GDP Spent on Welfare Benefits (including Pensions) and 
Figure 2 Numbers of Claimants of Major Groupings of Welfare Benefits 







































































































































































































Key aggregate economic figures 1960-2006 
The UK was characterised as the “sick man of Europe” in the 1960s and 70s. 
Average economic growth and productivity was low by European standards, and 
hence living standards grew more slowly.  
 








Inflation was also relatively high from the late 1960s, peaking in the mid-1970s at 
25%.  Unemployment was low on current ILO definitions around 4% and 
employment high, with 60% of the adult population in work or 75% of the working 
age population aged 16-64 for men and 16-59 for women). This period was also one 
of widespread conflict in industrial relations with a lot of strike action, which was at its 
most extreme in the Winter of Discontent 1978/79.   
 









1960  2%  1990  9% 
1971  10%  1996  2% 
1975  25%  2001  2% 
1980  18%  2006  3% 
1985  6%     
The 1980s saw the economy yawing from recession in 1980-82, a overheated boom 
1987-89 and recession again 1990-92. Over the period as a whole unemployment 
was very high, as was inflation, although less than in the 1970s. Growth bottomed 
out at around 2%, which was no longer below that of other European nations, owing 
to the more rapid slowdown in continental Europe. Employment recovered to that of 
1968 and 1975 by 1990, but fell away in the next recession. Employment rose 
amongst women who were primarily second earners within families, whilst the 
number of welfare dependent families continued to rise, peaking at 1 in 5 working 
age households 1995. 









1960-1978  2.77  2.41 
1979-1996  2.13  1.89 

























1970  4%  61%  1996  8%  57% 
1980  6%  60%  2001  5%  60% 
1984  12%  55%  2006  5%  60% 
1990  7%  60%        
2. Social Challenges and Welfare Reform from 1996  
The economy in the UK has performed well since 1995, being described by the 
OECD as the Goldilocks economy, neither too hot nor too cold but just right. Growth 
has been good, averaging 2.8% pa and has had little annual variation (the range has 
been 1.6% to 4%). This has been the highest among the major G7 economies over 
this period. Inflation has been low and stable since the Bank of England set interest 
rates independently of the government. The Retail Price Index measure has risen at 
around 3%, but the CPI (which is comparable with European measures) has 
averaged just over 2%. This benign picture led to budget surpluses being generated 
in 1998-2000, but a move to increase spending on Health and Education very rapidly 
after the 2001 election has seen the government budget move into sustained and 
structural deficits. The government is now seeking to reduce these deficits with 
smaller increases in spending and especially with restrictions in public sector pay 
growth. 
 
2.1 Fertility and the Ageing Population 
Like most European countries, the UK has low fertility and an ageing population.  
However, the extent of these two trends is less pronounced than in many other 
countries.  
After a period of decline in the 1980s and 1990s, birth rates in the UK are on the 
increase.  Following the baby boom in the early 60s, declining birth rates saw the 
total fertility rate
1 fall from a high of 2.95 children in 1963 to below the replacement 
rate of 2.1 children, reaching a low of 1.63 in 2001.  The five years since 2001, 
however, saw consecutive increases in fertility, with the latest figures showing a rate 
of 1.86 children in 2006, the highest level since 1980.  Birth rates have increased at 
all ages, but particularly to women in their late 30s and early 40s, and there has also 
been a rise in the proportion of births to women born outside the UK, increasing from 
12.8% in 1996 to 21.9% in 2006. The period of rising birth rates follows the 
increasing generosity of child-contingent benefits and maternity provision.  Between 
                                                 
1 The total fertility rate measures the average number of children that would be born to a hypothetical woman 
over her lifetime if she experienced the age-specific birth rates of a particular year across her own childbearing 
cycle. 
  
1999 and 2003, government spending per child grew by 50 percent in real terms, a 
change that was unprecedented over the previous thirty-year period, while paid 
maternity leave increased from 14 weeks in 1994 to 39 weeks from 2007.  Brewer et 
al. (2007) show that the advent of WFTC alone raised the birth rate of less educated 
mothers by 10% from 1999, which suggests that policy changes have made a 
sizable contribution to increasing the UK’s fertility rate. 
 
Twenty years ago, nearly 80 percent of women with children were in married 
couples; today the figure is only just over 50 percent.  The proportion of lone mothers 
has risen to nearly 30 percent, reflecting both rising separation and divorce rates, as 
well as an increase in never-married lone mothers.  Alongside this, there has been 
an increase in the proportion of mothers living in cohabiting couples.  In 2007, the 
majority of babies were born outside marriage for the first time.   
Rising birth rates mean that the UK population is growing as a result of natural 
change, as well as through net immigration.  However, increasing life expectancy 
and the ageing of the 1960s baby-boomers will cause the population to age.  The 
proportion aged 65+ is predicted to increase from 15.8 percent in 2000 to 25.3 
percent in 2050, although this increase is smaller than that for the EU25 – from 15.8 
percent to 29.5 percent.  Life expectancies at birth, currently 76.9 years for men and 
81.3 years for women, are above those for France, Germany, Belgium and Denmark, 
but below those for Ireland, Italy, Spain and Sweden.  
2.2 Labour Market and Unemployment Policy 
Unemployment had two marked peaks in 1986 and 1993, on both occasions this was 
around 12% of the economically active. Since 1993 open unemployment fell sharply 
until 2002, since which time it has been broadly flat at just over 5%. Employment in 
the UK is high at just under 75% of the working age population (age 16-59/64), a 
figure exceeded in Europe only in the Scandinavian countries.  Even before the fall 
in unemployment the large numbers reliant on welfare benefits who were not looking 
for work (i.e., living on sickness and disability benefits and lone parents on Income 
Support – social assistance benefits) became a government priority after the 1997 
election. With the decline in open unemployment, this hidden joblessness became a 
major social issue (see figure 2).   
 
The ambition of the incoming government was to raise economic activity and reduce 
welfare dependency, whilst simultaneously reducing poverty. There are obvious 
potential conflicts in this strategy. Raising the generosity of benefits reduces the 
depth of poverty, but is likely to reduce incentives to work. The government’s 
strategy to meet these twin and often contradictory goals consisted of five core 
elements: 
 
· Making work pay – raising incentives to work 
· Case management by a personal advisor - client engagement and activation within 
the welfare system undertaken by a personal advisor 
· Limited conditionality – welfare payments have attached behavioural requirements, 
with minimum income secure for vulnerable groups, (e.g., Educational Maintenance 
Allowance, New Deals for the unemployed, Work Focused Interviews and Work 
Related Activity Premium/Job Participation Payment under pilot). 
· Addressing key areas of social exclusion that damage people’s future life chances 
(including child poverty, youth long-term unemployment, teenage pregnancy, 
homelessness etc.) 
· Raising incentives for self-protecting savings among low income groups – savings 
gateway, stakeholder pensions, Children Trust Funds (saving pot schemes, which 
are also a form of targeted conditional financial support) 
 
The first three elements will be discussed in this sub-section, the latter two will be 
discussed under section 2.6 Poverty and Social Exclusion.  
 
Making Work Pay – National Minimum Wage 
Upon its election the current government made a number of key strides to raise take- 
home pay for low earning jobs. The most prominent measures were the introduction 
of, and later increases in, the National Minimum Wage and the expansion of the Tax 
Credit system. The UK had had a system of industry specific minimum wages set by 
Wages Councils dating back to 1917. As industries changed in importance many 
sectors were combined, but new sectors such as security remained uncovered. After 
1979 the value of minimum wages set by Wage Councils declined, and they were  
finally abolished in 1993. In 1998 the Low Pay Commission set a new NMW for the 
whole country and all sectors, but the initial coverage was low by international 
comparisons. Indeed, even this level was not raised much above prices until 2001, 
after which a sharp increase in the minimum wage occurred, but only until 2006.  
 
The core message of the impact of the NMW is set out in Figure 3. This shows wage 
growth at each percentile of the wage distribution compared to that at the median 
(50
th percentile) for two periods: 1992 to 1997, prior to the NMW’s introduction; and 
1997 to 2003, which covers the introduction in 1998 and substantial increases in 
relative value in 2002 and 2003. Prior to introduction there is pretty much a 
continuous upward sloping line with twists at the top and bottom reflecting far slower 
growth in earnings in lowest decile and faster growth in the top decile. By contrast, 
after introduction the pattern is U-shaped, with the most rapid growth in earnings at 
the lowest paid part of the distribution, with growth in earnings 20% above that at the 
median (growth at the median was slightly faster in the second period than the first). 
The upper half of the distribution has continued in a very similar fashion as before. 
Note that the faster growth in earnings in the second period is evident all the way up 
to the 40
th percentile, which is unlikely to be due to the NMW and probably reflects 
the tighter labour market. However, the impact of the NMW on the lowest paying 8 to 
10% of jobs is marked.  
 
Figure 3 Growth in Hourly Earnings by Percentile (compared to the median) 
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Making Work Pay – Tax Credits 
Minimum Wages raise the pay of all low paid workers, but take no account of family 
structure, such as the presence of children or numbers of earners or hours worked in 
a family. Hence the relationship between low hourly pay and low household income 
even among working families is far from close. Likewise, the working poor often do 
not have a worker in the lowest decile or so of hourly earnings. The government 
made clear its concern about poor work incentives for benefit dependent families 
with children in a series of publications (The Modernisation of Britain’s Tax and 
Benefit System, numbers 1 through to 5, 1997 to 1999). The response was a major 
expansion of the country’s Tax Credit system (then called Family Credit) under the 
banner of the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) and then later split into two parts – 
Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit.  
   
Before the 1998 Budget, support for children came from four sources: a universal 
per- child transfer (Child Benefit) normally paid to mothers, extra payments in 
means-tested benefits (Income Support) normally paid to the household head in 
workless families, a refundable tax credit for working families (Family Credit) paid to 
the mother, and one of two related non-refundable tax credits available to an earner 
within a couple.
2 The Government has increased the generosity of all four of these 
starting with the March 1998 budget, and all but Child Benefit have had some form of 
structural reform.  
 
The increases in the generosity of Child Benefit in the 1998 and 1999 budgets 
together raised the real level of support by 27 percent for the eldest child. The 
increases in support for children in means-tested benefits was focused on younger 
children between April 1997 and 2001, such that weekly payments for children up to 
4 years of age rose by £13.25 a week above inflation – a 73% real increase – whilst 
support for children aged 11-15 rose by just £4.25 in real terms. The result is that the 
level of financial support for children of all ages up to 15 have been equalized – older 
children had previously received more generous support. This reform partly reflects 
                                                 
2 There are approximately 7 million families with children in the UK, and 13 million children.  
recognition by the Government that poverty rates were higher among families with 
younger children, and partly it facilitates the move to an integrated child credit.  
The new Children’s Tax Credit was a non-refundable tax credit that replaces two 
mutually  exclusive  and  equal-valued  tax  credits:  the  Married  Couple’s  Allowance 
(MCA) and the Additional Person’s Allowance (APA).
3 The overall impact was that 
married  couples  without  children  lose  an  extra  tax  allowance,  and  families  with 
children, regardless of their marital status, receive around twice as much as before. 
Whereas  the  MCA  and  APA  were  available  to  all  taxpayers,  the  Children’s  Tax 
Credit was withdrawn at 6.7 percent from people paying higher-rates of income tax 
(over £33,515 in April 2001). 
The Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) was an evolutionary reform to the existing 
in-work benefit called Family Credit. It was announced in the Labour government’s 
first  full  budget  in  spring  1998,  and  became  available  to  claimants  from  October 
1999. The WFTC was available to families where any adult member is working 16 
hours a week or more. It consists of a per-family element – the same for couples and 
lone parents – and per-child elements. There is a flat zone where the maximum 
award is paid, and the credit is phased-out beyond an earnings limit of £92.90 a 
week  at  a  rate  of  55  percent  of  after-tax  income. This  equated  to  38%  of  gross 
income for a person on the basic-rate of tax and National Insurance rates, or a total 
marginal deduction rate of 69%.    
WFTC had 4 major differences from its predecessor. First, it was more generous, as 
both the family and the child elements have risen. For a family with one child, the 
WFTC was worth a maximum of £78.75 a week. Each subsequent child raised the 
maximum credit by £25.60 a week. Worth noting here is that, although the level of 
out-of-work  support  has  also  risen,  these  changes  by  themselves  made  little 
difference  to  work  incentives.  Second,  families  can  earn  more  before  support  is 
withdrawn. The maximum weekly earnings before withdrawal starts was raised from 
£80 under the old Family Credit system to £92.90. Third, the phase-out rate was 
lowered from 70 to 55 percent of after tax income. These three changes increased 
                                                 
3 The UK has an individual system of income tax. These credits and allowances appear in a person’s tax code 
through which employers assess and then deduct income tax directly from pay checks. Allowances are typically 
less generous than in the US, so people start paying income tax at lower annual incomes (see Gale (1997) and 
Brewer (2000) for more comparisons of the US and UK tax systems).   
support for those in full-time or better paid part-time work (i.e., earning more than 
£92.90)  and  extended  eligibility  to  in-work  support  to  a  large  number of families. 
Lastly, the WFTC can help with childcare costs though a new Childcare Tax Credit, 
which paid parents 70 percent of childcare costs up to a (generous) maximum of 
£100 a week for 1 child or £150 for more than 1 child. The Childcare Tax Credit is 
restricted to households where all parents are in paid work, but lone parents are the 
prime beneficiaries to date.  
The effect of these changes are shown in Figure 4a&b, which show the 2001 and 
1997 support packages for a couple with one child. The increased generosity of the 
WFTC over the previous in-work benefit accounts for £2.7 billion of this £7.2 billion 
early reform package total, with £2.5 billion going to child payments in means-tested 
and  universal  benefits,  and  £1.8  billion  on  the  Children’s  Tax  Credit  (see  HMT, 
2000). 
Figure 4 Picture of Welfare Support available for Families with Children under 
the pre-1997 system (Figure a) and WFTC circa 2001 system (Figure b) 
Figure a 
 

































































































Working Families' Tax Credit
Income support
Child benefit
Note: Assumes entitlement for WFTC reached at £59.20, or 16 hours work at the minimum wage.
 
The impact of the increased generosity of the WFTC and the Children’s Tax Credit is 
muted for those with medium to high rents.  Low-earning renters are eligible for rent 
support  known  as  Housing  Benefit  (owner-occupiers  normally  get  no  housing 
support). Housing Benefit is phased out as income rises, but at a faster rate than 
WFTC  –  65%,  and  starting  at  a  lower  income  level.
4  Under  FC,  the  maximum 
marginal deduction rate could reach 97 percent.
5 The increased generosity of the 
WFTC compared to FC has meant that fewer households claiming in-work support 
are eligible for HB, and the reduction in the taper has eliminated the worst of the 
poverty traps.  
The effect of the multiple phase-outs, and the effect of the increased generosity in 
WFTC increased the range of incomes (or rents) over which people are on both 
WFTC and HB phase-outs has been sharply reduced. This comes at the cost of a 
                                                 
4 All low-income households (not just renters) can apply for rebates for the local taxes in the UK, which are 
assessed against property values.  This rebate – Council Tax Benefit – is administered alongside Housing 
Benefit, and phased out at an additional 20 percent.  So if families receive both benefits, the combined 
withdrawal rate on post-tax income is 85 percent. 
5 Marginal deduction rate is the term used in the UK for the combined effect of taxes and benefit withdrawals 
(or phase-outs).   
large increase in the numbers with phase-out rates at around 70% stemming from 
the combination of income tax, National Insurance and tax credit withdrawal.   
In 2003 a second round of reform occurred and the WFTC was split into two parts: a 
Working Tax Credit paid to the principal earner, and a Child Tax Credit paid to the 
principal carer. The later now included all the child payments inside Income Support 
and the tax system (Childrens Tax Credit) and is paid alongside child benefit – so 
that all child payments were now paid to the primary carer through a single system. 
The new system had a number of other changes, including being assessed over 
annual income and paid through the year. Last year’s income is used as a prediction 
of this year’s annual income and this is then reassessed at the end of the year, and 
any  adjustments  (through  over-  or  under-payment)  are  then  made.  To  avoid  too 
many people repaying credits a disregard is employed, such that if income rises, but 
remains below this disregard, no repayment is required. This was initially quite low 
(around  £3,000),  but  has  since  been  raised  to  over  £20,000.  The  second  major 
change is that the withdrawal has been switched from an after tax net withdrawal 
rate of 55% to a gross (before tax) rate of 39%.  The new structure is laid out in 
Figure 5 on the same basis as Figure 4 for a family in 2003. 
Figure 5 The Post-2003 structure of Support for Families with Children 
 


















































Note: Assumes entitlement for employment tax credit reached at £59.20, or 16 hours work at the minimum wage. Values deflated to 2001-2  prices.
  
Making Work Pay – Tax and National Insurance 
The third element in making work pay entailed a significant reduction in income tax 
and NI contributions for lower earning individuals. This was done by extending the 
amount a person could earn before making NI contributions, and introducing a low 
starting rate of Income Tax at 10p in the pound. These early reforms have now 
largely been undermined since 2003, as tax- and NI-free allowances were linked to 
prices, not earnings, and the 10p starting rate of tax was abolished in 2007, whilst 
reducing the standard rate of tax to 20p from 22p.  
 
Case management with Limited conditionality  
From 1986, under the ReStart programme, the idea of job search conditions for the 
unemployed was enhanced and monitored with benefit sanctions if breached. This 
was greatly enhanced in 1996 under the move to Jobs Seeker Allowance (JSA). This 
renaming of unemployment benefits reflects the extra requirement to look for work 
actively of face sanctions. Claimants are required to keep a diary of job search 
activities, interviews etc. and they can be quizzed about this activity every two 
weeks, although in practice only those about who are thought suspicious are 
checked in depth. Claimants can not restrict the distance they have to travel to a job 
or the type of job sort after 13 weeks. This tightening of conditions has undoubtedly 
contributed to declining unemployment since 1986, but some of the displaced 
claimants have ended up on other, mostly sickness and disability, benefits. 
 
At this time there was limited support for job search activities for the unemployed. 
What was available included loans for things that would help secure work and 
provision of short courses in preparing a CV or interview techniques, etc. However, 
there was nothing for all other claimant groups. The strong conditionality meant a 
clear line between the unemployed and other claimant groupings (the sick and 
disabled and lone parents).  
 
New Deals for the Unemployed 
The incoming government added a New Deal structure on top of the required activity 
explained above. For young people (aged 18-24) after 6 months of claiming JSA, the 
claimant was placed in an intensive job search regime with more monitoring and help 
and guidance with job search. This is called the Gateway phase. If after 10 months  
the claimant is still without work, then they must partake in a designated activity 
programme. There are four major options: subsidised work, an education or training 
course that lasts for 9 months to a year, placement with a charitable body or 
environmental project or a self-employment start up. The decision of which branch to 
move onto is made in discussion between an advisor and the claimant, however, the 
education option is restricted to those with lower skills and the subsidised jobs are 
often in short supply. For older claimants a similar process starts at 18 months, but 
the activity programme is more flexible in that people can move from one option to 
another, as the personal advisor deems most appropriate.  
 
New Deals for Lone Parents and Sick and Disabled - Personalised Welfare-to-work 
Support  
The slightly later New Deals for those on inactive benefits offered a rather different 
structure. Participation for these groups was voluntary and so a more flexible 
approach to the support on offer and engagement between the personal advisor was 
created. This new approach is sometimes described as Personalised Welfare-to-
Work Support.  
 
If the claimant agrees to pursue participation in the New Deal, an Action Plan is 
designed delivering a package of support services tailored to the individual’s needs 
brokered by the Case Worker. The Action Plans set out an agreement between the 
claimant and a case worker on a return to work strategy and time scale. These 
contain a range of potential support services which are tailored to individual 
circumstances (short skills courses, confidence building, work trials, condition 
management, help getting child care, etc.)  Evaluation suggests that the New Deal 
for Lone Parents raises participants’ moves into work by 22 ppts (Dolton et al. 2005).  
 
Work Focused Interviews 
Upon introduction, participation rates were low in these New Deals for Lone Parents 
and the Disabled, but they were often successful in helping participants into work. So 
it was decided to introduce a Work Focused Interview (WFI) whereby Lone Parents 
(from 2001) had to meet their case worker on a regular basis to discuss the potential 
for return to work. This will include better off calculations for specimen jobs, 
discussions on childcare and the Action Plan based support. Attendance for Lone  
Parents is required, i.e., sanctions can apply if a claimant fails to attend. They will 
shortly amount to 6 monthly and will be even more intensive when the child turns 14. 
Evaluations suggest that the WFI regime raised participation in New Deal for Lone 
Parents by 25% (Knight et al. 2004).  There is a danger that such expansion could 
lead to reduced success in moving claimants into work, as the expansion includes 
less job ready or less willing participants. Figure 6 suggests that this was not the 
case with WFIs. The figure plots the numbers participating and numbers entering 
work after 6 months on the New Deal. They track well with a fairly constant entry rate 
of about 50%.  Note the increase in participation after WFIs were introduced in mid-
2001. 
 
Figure 6 Numbers Participating in the New Deal for Lone Parents and Entering 
Work within 6 months of starting a New Deal, 1999 to 2004 – Source Department 













The New Deal for Disabled People was very similar to that for lone parents, but with 
extra support for condition management to help people work with their conditions 
rather than waiting for the condition to improve. It had even lower take up than that 
for lone parents – but again, for those that did the outcomes were good. So following 
the use of WFIs for lone parents this approach was tried for the sick and disabled in 





















































Policy Reform and Employment  
Figure 2 above charted how the numbers of claimants for the major out-of-work 
benefits fell from over 6 million in 1995 to 4.7 million in 2006. JSA unemployment 
benefits fell rapidly with the economic upswing from 1996 to 1999, and this decline 
accounts for 1.2 million of the fall. However, this stopped and reversed a little after 
2004. The contribution of the New Deal programme to this fall is minor, as the main 
point is to address long-term unemployment and even then the contribution of the 
NDs is minor (van Reenan 2000). However, the making work pay strategy has made 
a larger contribution to reducing joblessness, especially among families with 
children. The numbers of Lone Parents on Welfare have fallen from 1,025 to 777 
thousand (1995 to 2006) and the employment rate of this group has risen from 44% 
to 57% over this period. This is an extraordinarily rapid rise. Evaluation has 
consistently shown that the WFTC contributed around 4 percentage points to that 
rise between 1999 and 2003 (around 70,000) and policy is likely to have had 
continued effects since the move to the new Tax Credits (see Gregg et al. 2007 for a 
summary).  
 
Figure 2 above also shows that over this period there was a slight rise in the 
numbers claiming sick and disability benefits although this peaked in 2004 and has 
begun to fall. This group, along with lone parents, remain a major policy concern for 
the government to meet its targets on employment and poverty. Policy development 
for this group is discussed further below.  
 
Current Policy Pilots and Reform Proposals 
 
The process of welfare reform in the UK since 1997 has been a rolling one rather 
than a single big bang. Further, policy makers have regularly sought evidence of 
some degree of success from reforms in welfare-to-work programmes before 
national introduction. There has thus been a culture of piloting reforms. The analysis 
above highlighted some of the remaining important challenges for welfare reform in 
the UK, the large numbers of disability benefits, the slowing down of employment 
gains for lone parents, the aging population and (not mentioned in detail) the large 
numbers of working poor families with two or more children.  
  
Overall economic inactivity rates have fallen only marginally to around 21%, but this 
broadly static picture of inactivity masks an ageing population and rising numbers in 
full-time education, which push inactivity up. Improvements within key groups, such 
as lone parents, older workers and the emerging pathways evidence for the sick and 
disabled, suggest there have been improvements of substantial worth. Figure 7 
shows inactivity rates by age (16 to 70) for the UK in 1997 and 2006, excluding full-
time students. The picture shows that there have been marked falls in inactivity 
amongst those aged 50+, typically of around 5 percentage points, but we see little 
change among younger groups (around 1ppt declines between 25 and 50). The rise 
in education participation among the young and the general ageing of the population 
(in particular, the first post-war baby boom,1947 to 1950, who are now approaching 
60), mask this development in aggregate data. 
 
Figures 1 and 7 therefore highlight the three (not mutually exclusive) target 
populations the government wishes to raise employment among: lone parents, the 
sick and disabled and those over 50. These groups must be brought back into the 
labour market if the government is going to meet its targets of reducing child poverty 
(by half the 1998 rate by 2010) and of raising the working age employment rate to 
80% (no specified time). Virtually all jobless families with children are now either on 
lone parent or disability benefits rather than JSA for the unemployed.  
  




























































Current  Pilots 
 
To address these issues the government has three major current pilot programmes 
in the field which are producing information for the design of possible policy reforms 
in 2008 and beyond.  
 
The three pilots are: 
Pathways  
The Pathways programme seeks to help claimants of sickness and disability benefits 
(Incapacity Benefit and Income Support with Disability Premium) get back to work. It 
consists of six Work Focused Interviews in the first 9 months of a person’s claim. At 
these interviews the client is encouraged to join the Choices programme (which can 
contain  mixtures  of  rehabilitation  and  New  Deal  for  Disabled  People)  and  is 
supported by a Back-to-Work Bonus and a Job Preparation Premium. These help 
make sure work pays and that participants are able to meet any costs associated 
with  the  extra  activity  required.  The  Choices  support  package  is  almost  always 
delivered by an outside contractor, rather than the government agency.   
    
Pathways, to date, has applied only to new claimants, but an additional pilot for the 
‘short term stock’, that is, those who have been in receipt of benefit for between nine 
months and 3 years, has started. The pilots or ‘Pathfinder’ areas have been chosen 
and implemented in three waves. The first covering four relatively small Job Centre 
Plus districts started in October 2003. The second wave started in April 2004 and a 
more substantive group, which brings coverage to around a third of the country, was 
implemented from October 2005 through to October 2006
6. The Programme will be 
rolled out nationally by the end of 2008. 
 
Pathways appears to be having an impact on numbers leaving incapacity benefits. 
Figure 8 shows the proportion of initial claimants in a month who are no longer in 
receipt of benefits 6 months later. Each month reported thus reflects the month of 
entry on to benefit. The count is of the proportion of the initial claimants who are no 
longer in receipt 6 months later, so any claimant who leaves but later returns to 
being  a  claimant  counts  as  a  benefit  recipient.  It  is  clear  that  both  phases  of 
Pathways’ implementation have reduced the numbers of claimants by 7% after 6 
months. There are also indications that this decrease has been associated with a 
reduction in the total number of benefit recipients in the pilot Districts. There is a risk, 
however, that it is the most job ready who move into work and hence these people 
would have returned to work anyway, but at a later date (see Adam et al. 2006 for 
evidence on Pathways to Work). 
 
                                                 
6 Current Pilot areas: Began October 2003: Bridgend & Rhondda, Cynon, Taff, Derbyshire,  Renfrewshire, 
Inverclyde, Argyll & Bute;  Began April 2004: Lancashire East, Essex, Gateshead & South Tyneside, Somerset  
PBR04 announcement: Phase 1 Jobcentre Plus Districts (October 2005): Glasgow, Cumbria, Lancashire West; 
Phase 2 Jobcentre Plus Districts (April 2006): County Durham, City of Sunderland, Greater Manchester Central, 
Liverpool & Wirral, Swansea Bay West Wales, Lanarkshire & East Dunbartonshire,  Barnsley, Doncaster & 
Rotherham, Tees Valley; Phase 3 Jobcentre Plus Districts (October 2006) Staffordshire, Greater Mersey, 
Eastern Valleys  
  
Figure 8 Percentage of Claimants Leaving Sickness and Disability Benefits 
after 6 months under the Pathways Programme 



































































































































































The off-flow rates presented are  produced from the Working Age Statistical Database (WASD). WASD does not  include a proportion of short-term 









So the crucial question is: how long can these reductions in caseload persist? Figure 
9 shows the same information as Figure 8, but 1 year after claims have started, 
rather than after 6 months. The first monthly cohort of Phase 1 pilots to reach a year 
from the pilot start are shown by the vertical line and are still showing a 5% reduced 
caseload on welfare. So, whilst there had been some decay, there was still a marked 
lowering of caseload after a year. The Phase 2 pilots had not been running for a full 
year for this data period, but the pre-effect is apparent in the two months prior to start 
up. Early evidence suggests that the policy is not helping those with mental health 
problems (e.g., depression and anxiety), nor those with physical conditions.   
  
Figure 9 Percentage of Claimants Leaving Sickness and Disability Benefits 
after 12 months under the Pathways Programme 




























The off-flow rates presented are  produced from the Working Age Statistical Database (WASD). WASD does not  include a proportion of short-term 





The effects of Pathways and the increasing focus on disability within JC+ is for the 
first time leading to a pronounced decline in the numbers of claimants. Numbers on 
both disability benefits had previously risen continuously, from around 700,000 in 
1979 to a little over 2.77 million in November 2003, but they are now 100,000 below 
this peak. This represents healthy progress in tackling the problem.  
 
New Deal plus for Lone Parents 
The pilots addressing potential further support mechanisms for lone parents include 
an  in-work  credit  of  £40  on entry  into  work  paid for  one  year  and,  in  a  reduced 
number of areas, a Work Search Premium designed to generate greater participation 
in NDLP and other programmes. More recently a full package of potential support 
including  the  in-work  credits  and  an  activational  payment  (entitled  Work  Related 
Activity Payment – WRAP) has started, labelled the ND+LP pilot programme. Early 
evaluation of this new package suggest that it has raised lone parent employment in 
targeted areas by 1.2 ppts, but it had a more marked impact in raising employment 
among those with over 12 months of claiming benefits previously (where the change 
was 7ppts after 2 years of the scheme).   
 
Employment Retention and Advancement Pilot  
The Employment Retention and Advancement pilot (ERA) is aimed at understanding 
better what policy mix can support retention of re-entrants in the labour market after 
leaving welfare benefits. This focuses on time-limited financial support and follow up 
contact between the case manager, the worker (former claimant) and their employer. 
In addition, this pilot programme is trying to engage with non-claimant/non-working 
partners of those in-work, but at risk of in-work poverty. The first evaluation evidence 
is now available and a few pointers are clear. Engaging non-working partners proved 
very difficult. The ambition to improve job retention has seen reductions in repeat 
benefit claims for both New Deal groups (NDLP and ND 25+) of 4-5 percentage 
points. Earnings advancement has a 29% increase in earnings for NDLP group 
(mainly by raising working hours rather than hourly wages with a 7pp increase in 
likelihood of working full-time), but much smaller effects on earnings for WTC/ND25+ 
groups. Skill development has also proved somewhat difficult, but an increase in 
likelihood of combining training/education with employment of 14 percentage points 
for lone parents on WTC, but much smaller for other groups. Compared to US 





New Disability Benefit 
A Welfare Reform Bill currently in parliament suggests a new test for disability 
benefit claimants. The two different disability benefits (one contributory and one 
means-tested social assistance) are to be merged into one. Those making claims will 
be split into two groups: the most disabled will receive the full benefit without 
conditions, whilst those with less severe conditions (based on functional capabilities) 
will only receive the full benefit if they engage in the action plan process described 
earlier under Pathways. If they fail to meet the agreed activity requirements, they will 
lose part of their benefit (perhaps £30, which would take them done to the same 
rates as JSA).  
 
                                                 
7 DWP briefing, sourced from Dorsett et al (2007) Implementation and first-year impacts of the UK 
ERA demonstration, DWP research report 412. 
  
Further Lone Parent Reforms 
A proposed further reform for lone parent benefits is to transfer lone parents on to 
JSA unemployment benefits when the youngest child reaches 12 and in due course 
to age 7 (rather than 16 at present). They will then be treated as a special category 
of the JSA unemployed, with extra support services to help the transition back to 
work. Therefore, this will be rather like the New Deals for the Unemployed, but the 
details are not yet clear.   
 
These developments would move the UK much further toward a mixed approach of 
support services and sanctions, whereas to date conditionality has been used rather 
lightly. 
 
2.3 Old-age Pensions 
The population’s ageing is putting increased strain on the UK pension system.  
Unlike many other OECD countries, there is not the prospect of rapidly growing state 
spending on pensions, but the pension system is not without its problems.   
The first tier of the UK pension system is the Basic State Pension, a flat-rate, fairly 
minimal pension paid to men from age 65 and women from age 60, rising to 65 from 
2020.  Receipt of the full Basic State Pension depends on contributions and there 
are big gaps in coverage for those with caring responsibilities, with more than two-
thirds of women retiring today failing to qualify for a full pension.   
Since the early 1980s, the Basic State Pension has been up-rated annually in line 
with inflation (rather than wage growth) and its value has fallen relative to earnings.  
On top of the Basic State Pension sits a second tier of compulsory pension 
provision.  The default is membership of the state scheme (formerly the state 
earnings-related pension scheme SERPS, now the state second pension S2P), but 
individuals can choose to opt out into a private pension.  When it was introduced, 
SERPS was intended to pay a pension worth one-quarter of an individual's best 
twenty years' earnings (up to a specified upper earnings limit), but its value has 
gradually been reduced and in the medium term, S2P will become a flat-rate top-up 
to the basic state pension.  Even at its most generous for individuals retiring at the 
turn of the century, however, the combined pension from BSP and SERPS yielded a  
replacement rate of around 40 percent for someone on median earnings. This is 
relatively low by European standards.     
Rather than increasing the value of contributory pensions, the Labour government 
chose to target financial support at the poorest pensioners by raising the value of 
means-tested benefits through the introduction in 1999 of the Minimum Income 
Guarantee, changed to Pension Credit in 2003.  These reforms were relatively 
successful in reducing pensioner poverty and raising replacement rates at the 
bottom of the income distribution, although take-up rates of Pension Credit are still 
quite low – estimated at around 60 percent of caseload.  Since their introduction, the 
value of means-tested benefits for pensioners has been annually up-rated in line with 
earnings and, as their reach has crept up the income distribution, there has been 
growing concern about the potential disincentive effects on saving that such 
extensive means-testing might have. This was identified as a key issue by the 
independent Pensions Commission reporting on the state of the UK pension system 
in 2005.  One of its central recommendations was to restore the earnings link in the 
Basic State Pension in order to reduce dependency on means-testing, and this is 
due to be implemented in 2012.  There will also be more generous credits for those 
with caring responsibilities.   
Compared to many other European countries, the UK has a relatively high level of 
private pension provision.  Between 1978 and 1988 individuals could opt out of the 
state second tier into a defined benefit (final salary) scheme. From 1988 onwards 
individuals could additionally opt out into a defined contribution (money purchase) 
pension scheme.  The option to opt-out of the state system helped to preserve 
occupational DB pensions and encouraged take-up of individual DC schemes.  
Nearly half of people now entering retirement receive more money from one of these 
private (occupational or individual) schemes than they do from the state.   
However, the relatively low – and falling – generosity of the state schemes means 
that the overall system is very reliant on private schemes to deliver reasonable 
replacement rates to the middle and top of the income distribution. Moreover, there 
is concern about growing gaps in coverage of private schemes that will leave people 
with relatively low levels of income in retirement.    
Cost pressures from increasing longevity, as well as from a growing burden of 
regulation, have caused many DB occupational schemes to close to both new and 
(albeit less frequently) existing members.  Take-up of individual DC schemes has 
failed to fill the gap and, if anything, has also been in decline.  The government 
introduced stakeholder pensions from 2001 to provide a regulated, but privately-
provided individual DC scheme suitable for low- to middle-earners, but their 
introduction has had almost no effect on overall take-up rates.  The government’s 
policy towards private provision was initially one of “informed choice”, underpinned 
by a belief that if “given the right opportunities, people will plan ahead sensibly”.  In 
other words, the government would provide information and make suitable products 
available, but leave individuals to make savings decisions themselves.  However, 
there is a growing body of evidence from new behavioural economics that letting 
people make their own decisions does not necessarily yield optimal outcomes; that 
default options, for example, can have a huge effect on whether or not people belong 
to a pension, how much they save and where they choose to invest.  The conclusion 
drawn from this literature is that the government can – and indeed should – 
encourage saving by framing individuals’ pension choices.  The result has been a 
move to introduce a new National Pension Savings Scheme which will automatically 
enrol all eligible employees into a low-cost individual pension account, albeit with the 
option to opt out.  Individuals in the scheme will be required to contribute a minimum 
of 4% earnings, with employers contributing a further 3%, and the government, 1%.  
The introduction of automatic enrolment through this scheme, recommended by the 
independent Pensions Commission, and taken up by the Government in its recent 
White Paper, is intended to boost take-up of private pension saving.     
The third main proposal from the Pensions Commission which has been adopted by 
the  government  concerns  gradually  raising  the  state  pension  age  for  men  and 
women from 65 in 2020 to 68 by 2050.  This follows a period of over twenty years 
from  the  1970s  to  the  mid  1990s  during  which  retirement  ages  have  fallen,  in 
practice  to  well  below  the  current  state  pension  ages.  Together  with  rising  life 
expectancy, this has meant that people now spend a longer proportion of their lives 
retired (see figure).    
Figure 10 Years spent in education, work and retirement, by date of birth cohort 
 
Note to figure: Retirement age for 1950 and 1980 cohorts is assumed to be unchanged from 1935 cohort.  
Age when leaving school and retirement age based on Family Expenditure Survey.  Data on life 
expectancy from ONS Population Trends (2004). 
In raising the state pension age, the government wants to “signal the need for a 
behavioural change”, for if we are living longer, we may need to work for longer.  The 
UK already has a lower inactivity rate among older workers (aged 55-64) than much 
of continental Europe and the rate has fallen by 5 percentage points since 1997 to 
around 30%.  In practice, what the government does to the state pension age is 
likely to have only a limited direct effect on employment among this group, since 
retirement decisions are likely to be more affected by incentives in private pensions 
than what is happening to the state pension.  However, much of the evidence points 
to people working into older ages in the future.   
Until recently, many DB schemes encouraged early retirement, but now, faced with 
growing deficits, they are reducing provision for early retirement and raising normal 
retirement ages.  So, retirement ages among people with occupational pensions will 
undoubtedly rise in the future.  For people with individual schemes, the age at which 
they retire will depend on the size of funds that they have been able to build up and  
their investment strategies (and asset returns) in the run-up to retirement.  
Preliminary evidence shows that people with individual DC schemes have typically 
built up far less pension wealth than those in DB schemes, again pointing to later 
retirement.  
Among those with no private pension, it is income support and, more commonly, 
disability benefits that have provided an alternative route into early retirement before 
the state pension age.  Nearly half the total 2.3 million incapacity benefit recipients 
are aged 50+.  From 2008, the introduction of the Employment and Support 
Allowance will aim to encourage people off disability benefits and into work.  
However, since the reforms are primarily targeted at the flow of new claimants, 
rather than the existing stock of recipients, it may take a while to have a big impact.   
In many European countries, the challenge of reducing projected spending on 
pensions without imposing big cuts in pensioners’ real incomes has often resulted in 
political gridlock in pension reform.  As noted by Disney et al (2007), the UK stands 
in stark contrast for the frequency with which reforms have been implemented in 
recent years – a series of major reforms have come into effect in 1999, 2001, 2002 
and 2006 (see Disney et al. 2007). The nature of the UK’s “pensions crisis” is quite 
different to that in many European countries – the problem is not one of spiralling 
costs, but that past reforms which have brought down the costs (indexing the Basic 
State Pension to prices and scaling back on the generosity of the state second 
pension) have led to growing gaps in provision, exposed further by the likely decline 
in employer pensions. These past reforms also created a system of almost 
unparalleled complexity, which perhaps inevitably has led to further tinkering with 
individual elements of the system in order to achieve a better whole.  Many of the 
changes, such as the expansion of means-tested benefit, have focused on short-
term problems (poverty among current pensioners), but have carried the seed of 
longer-term problems (disincentives for saving) which require further reforms to be 
solved.  The appointment of the independent Pensions Commission in 2005 to make 
an assessment of the current state of pension provision and recommendations for 
reform was not motivated by the need to overcome political stalemate, but rather a 
recognition of the need for a longer-lasting set of reforms.  Whether it will achieve 
this or not remains to be seen.    
2.4 Health 
The period since 1997 has seen unprecedented growth in the resources devoted to 
the NHS in the UK. The long-run trend in annual increases in NHS expenditure since 
1948 is around 3%. Real growth during the Blair era exceeded this and in the second 
Blair administration was around 8% per annum, meaning that the UK spent just 
under 9% of its GDP on health care in 2006. This increase in real resources was 
accompanied by the greater use of targets. There were targets set for inputs – 
staffing numbers, aspects of care, most notably waiting lists, and towards the end of 
the period for health outputs.  
 
The record on growth in inputs was impressive. In 2006 compared to 1997 there 
were 26% more nurses, 56% more consultants, 20% more GPs (FTEs). This growth 
in numbers was accompanied by large increases in pay, ranging from 30% for GPs 
to 10% for nurses. Levels of staffing are now in the middle of the international league 
and the pay of salaried physicians is near the top of the league. 
 
The impact on waiting lists has also been large. In 1997 the maximum allowed 
waiting times for non-emergency hospital inpatient treatment was 18 months. By 
2005 this was brought down to six months. The average wait was considerably lower 
and had also fallen over the period. Performance on other non-targetted aspects of 
treatment was less satisfactory. Productivity increases were small. The volume of 
activity showed few change electives between 1998-2001, with some increase 
thereafter, though much of the growth was in emergency care. The growth in real 
inputs was quite similar, meaning that at aggregate level there was no general 
increase in productivity. In other areas, there was poor performance, for example, 
slow uptake of new cancer drugs relative to other countries. 
 
The impact on health outcomes is less clear. Satisfaction levels have risen and there 
were some improvements in the health of the nation, as measured for example by 
falls in mortality from heart disease and cancer, but much of this fall appears to be a 
continuation of previous trends. In terms of levels of health, the UK remains in the 
middle of the international pack. Indeed, for some diseases (like cancer) survival 
levels are below those of other high income OECD countries. Obesity, which is even  
less susceptible to health service intervention, has been rising steadily and the UK is 
near the top of the international league for both adults and children. 
 
2.5 Education Development  
Education, like Health, has seen a large increase of government spending since 
2000. The long-run share of GDP spent on education is around 5%, but when the 
New Labour government was elected spending was below this average and fell to 
4.5%, with tight spending plans in the first two years inherited from the previous 
regime and stuck to by the incoming one. Since then, spending has increased to 
5.75% of GDP in a little under a decade (HMT 2006). This puts the UK firmly in the 
upper half of spending in developed countries (OECD 2002). 
 













Source OCED, Education at a glance, 2007  
 
The increases in spending have been primarily directed at three areas. First, capital 
spending on new schools and buildings has been implemented after what was seen 
as long-term under-investment. Second, there has been an increase in spending 
aimed at raising participation in schooling in the Upper Secondary and Tertiary 
areas. Thirdly, and perhaps most strikingly, is the pre-school period. This has 
involved a guaranteed free ½ nursery places for 4 year-olds from 1999 and to 3 year 










































Below Upper Secondary Upper Secondary Tertiary 
been increased funding for nursery provision in deprived areas where supply was 
seen as weak. Moreover, the Sure Start programme for the under 4s has also been 
targeted at deprived areas. This package is now being co-ordinated by Children’s 
Centres in each neighbourhood to ensure delivery of Sure Start, nursery places, 
some health visiting services and after-school clubs and holiday schemes.  
 
This programme of spending has been focused at addressing what the government 
has seen as key weaknesses in the UK education system. First, as shown in Figure 
10 below, is the large proportion of school leavers not going onto Upper Secondary 
Education. Despite sizable improvements in this area, the UK is still lagging behind 
many countries.   
 
Further, the emerging evidence of a long tail of low achieving children in the UK from 
studies such as PISA (OECD, 2007)  and the large educational gradient in 
attainment by social background of children on entry into the school system have led 
to the strong focus on pre-school years (see Feinstein, 2003). Hence the strong 
focus on spending on pre-school services with extra funding in the most deprived 
wards. However, it is also true that on entry to school these social gradients continue 
to widen, and this raises concerns both about differential access to the best schools 
and the level of support for schools serving deprived communities.  
 
2.6 Poverty and social exclusion  
Figure 1 showed how the fall in numbers of claimants has covered the increase in 
spending on children and pensioners where welfare payments have seen increased 
generosity and the cost of the WFTC. The tax credit system and tax allowances for 
children that existed prior to WFTC is not shown (owing to difficulty in finding data), 
but they accounted for 1/3 to 1/2% of GDP.  Hence total welfare spending, including 
pensions and tax credits, has fallen by around 1.8% of GDP despite the expansion of 
tax credits, increased generosity of support for children in low-income households 
and low-income pensioners and an ageing population. In large part this has come 
from rising employment (and falling welfare rolls), but it also reflects a squeeze on 
the generosity of payments for jobless working age adults and pensioners who have 
private incomes where support has remained linked only to prices. Again, with  
slower progress in reduction in welfare rolls and resources continuing to be put in to 
reduce child poverty, this decline in total spend halted from around 2003. 
 
Poverty 
Poverty measured as persons in households below 60% of median income (the UK 
uses two measures before and after housing costs) rose steadily from low levels in 
late 1970s to a peak in the early 1990s. Measured after housing costs are deducted, 
this peak showed around one in four people to be in poverty. For a decade poverty 
levels have fallen, except in the last year. But the improvement is moderate rather 
than dramatic.  
 
Figure 11 Proportion of People Living in Poor Households 1979 to 2006 
 
 
To a degree this masks two groups with marked decreases in poverty, children and 
especially pensioners with modest increases among childless working age people 
(see Figure 12). The decline in poverty among families with children has come about 
partly through increased employment and partly through the increased generosity of 
benefits. However, much of the increased generosity compensates for rising 
earnings, as the standard benchmark in the UK is for benefits to rise only with prices. 
The sharp fall in pensioner poverty reflects the increasing incidence among newly 
retired groups to have occupational pensions or the second stage earnings related 
state pension. The Minimum Income Guarantee has also played a substantial  
contribution. Although poverty has fallen in the UK, Britain remains a high poverty 
country within Europe and child poverty is especially high.  
 
Figure 12 Proportion of People in Poverty by population group 1995-2006 
 
 
A key supporting role has been attempted by reducing the incidence of longer-term 
damage that certain conditions, often described as social exclusion, can cause. This 
damage (described as “scarring”) derives from evidence that falling into certain 
states reduces people’s employment or earnings opportunities in the future, and 
often other dimensions of future opportunities, as well. These states include child 
poverty, long-term unemployment (especially for youth), teenage pregnancy, 
homelessness, and of course low educational achievement. Some of these states 
are directly targeted through welfare reform (poverty and long-term joblessness), but 
others were the target of other policy reforms delivered by other departments of 
government. The Educational Maintenance Allowance (which is paid to 16 and 17 
year-olds from poor families at a rate of £30 a week to stay in full-time education) or 
the Sure Start programme (to boost early child development in deprived areas) are 
clear examples (see Dearden et al. 2005 for an assessment of EMA and National 
Evaluation of Sure Start, 2008).  
 
Raising incentives for self-protecting savings   
Most countries give tax breaks for certain forms of saving. This is close to universal 
for pension saving, such that contributions to pensions are not taxed. But this is often 
extended to interest received in certain other savings products, such as the 
Individual Savings Account (ISA) in the UK. Such tax breaks are paid at the marginal 
rate of tax, and hence non-tax payers do not receive them and they are worth more 
to those on higher rates of tax. The government has introduced a number of savings 
products which are worth more to low earners and non-taxpayers. These include the 
Savings Gateway, Stakeholder Pensions and Children Trust Funds. These are 
saving schemes where, rather than tax relief, there are matched payments from the 
state, which are thus also a form of conditional financial support. The aim is to 
support self-protection against income loss through unemployment, illness or 
retirement among lower income groups. This approach still remains in its infancy, 
however.  
 
3. Europe and the UK Welfare State 
The UK came closest to the European Social Model in the 1970s when there was a 
concerted effort to bring trade unions into a more co-ordinated dialogue with 
business and government, with the Social Insurance Model still central to the 
workings of the Welfare State. Widespread industrial unrest, culminating in the 
Winter of Discontent (1978/79) undermined this approach and was followed by a 
clean break with the election of Mrs. Thatcher’s government.  Mrs Thatcher steered 
the UK rapidly away from the Social Model concepts of social solidarity, collective 
responsibility and social justice, toward a firm focus on individual freedom and 
responsibility and entrepreneurial incentives (low marginal tax rates for the wealthy). 
The shift in the welfare system was toward a residualised low  value means tested 
safety net and personal saving, and away from a social insurance model. The 
relationship with the EU over this period was always arms length and often hostile, 
especially in the areas of labour market regulation. 
 
The New Labour government from the outset made it clear that it was not going to 
return to tripartite institutions and widespread regulation of markets, but it did place a 
clear emphasis on social justice (reducing poverty and social exclusion). Hence the 
UK has developed a model that has a rather distinctive flavour compared to most 
European countries, with some aspects of models used in the US and the  
Scandinavian countries. The UK model however, is perhaps closer to that of 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand than most European countries.  
 
Denmark and Sweden have long had models encapsulating high benefits with strong 
activational support systems and required activities after certain durations. Richard 
Layard, an early advocate of the New Deal programme in the UK, was influenced 
more by Sweden than the US in his thinking (See Layard et al. 1991). Swedish and 
Danish childcare and maternity leave laws have also heavily influenced UK policy 
developments over the last few years. However, the strong history of 
experimentation and evaluation in the US has been very influential too, although it 
has not always led to similar policy outcomes. The Minnesota Family Income 
Program, the Canadian Self-sufficiency Programme, and the Californian GAIN 
Program were influential on the development of UK welfare-to-work programmes 
such as the NDLP. The Earned Income Tax Credit was the inspiration behind WFTC 
and Early Head Start evidence drove the development of Sure Start in the UK.  
 
Within Europe, the UK model most closely resembles a less generous version of the 
welfare systems in Denmark or Holland, which are sometimes referred to as 
embodying Flex-security. This evolutionary process of New Labour’s reforms had 
some antecedents prior to 1996, but has really come to the fore since that date. The 
UK has for some years seen itself as setting the pace on aspects of welfare reform 
within Europe. In areas such as job protection and labour market regulation it has 
long resisted European harmonisation or extensions of policy. More recently it has 
been engaged in advocating aspects of its model to the rest of Europe, most 
particularly tax credits and activation in welfare. It has thus wanted to be seen 
positively in cross-country reports or reports from international bodies such as the 
OECD and IMF. Whilst this view has some merit when comparisons are made with 
the other major EU countries (France, Germany, Italy and Spain), it rather ignores 
similar but earlier developments, along with evidence of success being made in 
smaller countries such as Denmark and Holland.  
 
In other areas the UK debate views itself to be lagging behind other countries and is 
thus more prone to learning from other European countries. Childcare and maternity 
leave is one area that has been mentioned earlier, but the biggest debate in the UK  
is probably around school attainment differences between low and high ability 
children, which are much bigger in the UK than most other countries. Another related 
issue is that of school attainment gaps between poor and affluent children. Other 
areas include children looked after by the state, mental health, obesity, and teenage 
pregnancy. 
 
In this way commentary acts as an open method of co-ordination, and the UK has 
wanted to prove itself fully informed of international best practice and to be one of 
pace setters. There remains at best a lukewarm attitude to the EU within the UK 
government, with strong concerns of expansion of EU competencies into areas of 
national sovereignty. Additionally, the position of the UK outside the Euro area 
means that the Growth and Stability Pact has little traction, with more focus on the 
government meeting its own “Golden Rule” of borrowing only to invest over the 
economic cycle. Despite this rule, the government appears to be running large 




In the UK, welfare has undergone two very profound periods of reform since 1979. 
The first was a move away from a contributory social insurance model to a low value 
social assistance model, this lasted up to 1996. The second phase started in 1996 
and involves a move to an activational welfare model with greater emphasis on 
incentives, support services and conditionality.  
 
The emerging UK model has a rather distinctive flavour, compared to most European 
countries, with some aspects of US thinking and some aspects drawn from 
Scandinavian examples. The UK model however, is perhaps closer to that of 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand than most European countries. Within Europe 
the model most closely resembles a less generous version of the welfare systems in 
Denmark or Holland, which are sometimes referred to as embodying Flex-security. 
 
As a direction of travel from the previous regime(s), this represents an increase in 
engagement and support functions, increases in the (disciplinary) required activities,  
combined with increased financial support and personalised support services.  
However, in areas of social inclusion the UK has been much more open to ideas and 
current programmes used in different EU countries and the process of open method 
of co-ordination, and in particular the spread of best practice through evidence and 
research is widely supported in government and the wider academic and 
campaigning sectors.  
 
As a move away from the ethos and regime established in the Conservative years, 
this represents a degree of modest convergence between the UK and continental 
Europe. However, this is not convergence driven mainly by the EU, for the spread of 
ideas and best practice, the concept at the heart of Open Method Co-ordination is an 
imprecise reality for UK policy making. There has been a strong emphasis on 
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